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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by 
a federal court of appeals opinion between March 13, 2009 and October 
1, 2009.  This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then 
by subject matter. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive 
analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
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CIVIL MATTERS 
BANKRUPTCY 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 (BAPCPA) – Allowance of Deduction for Vehicles 
Unencumbered by Debt or Lease: In re Tate, 571 F.3d 423 (5th 
Cir. 2009) 
The 5th Circuit joined the 6th, 7th, and 10th Circuits in applying a 
“plain language” approach to the transportation ownership deduction of 
the “means test,” provided for in the BAPCPA.  Id. at 428.  “The means 
test takes the debtor’s current monthly income and reduces it by allowed 
deductions set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).”  Id. at 425.  
The transportation ownership deduction “allows the debtor to deduct . . . 
the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts.”  Id.  “Under the plain 
language approach, the vehicle ownership deduction that applies to a 
debtor is the one that corresponds to his geographic region and number 
of cars, regardless of whether that deduction is an actual expense.”  Id. at 
426 (internal quotations omitted).  This approach differs from the 
Internal Revenue Manual approach, adopted by the 8th and 9th Circuits, 
which disallows the vehicle ownership deduction where the debtor had 
not made monthly debt payments.  Id.  In choosing to follow the plain 
language approach to the “means test,” the 5th Circuit tracked the 7th 
Circuit’s reasoning.  Id. at 427.  The court “found the plain language 
approach more strongly supported by the language and logic of the 
statute.”  Id.  Moreover, “policy considerations supported [the 7th 
Circuit’s] interpretation because costs are associated with vehicle 
ownership even when no lease or loan payments are due.”  Id. at 428. 
Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(BAPCPA) – Projected Disposable Income: In re Nowlin, 576 
F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2009) 
The 5th Circuit addressed the issue of how to interpret the new 
definition of “disposable income” in § 1325(b)(2) in the BAPCPA and its 
effect on the meaning of “projected disposable income” in § 
1325(b)(1)(B).   Id. at 261.  The court noted that the 8th and 10th Circuits 
used a flexible approach when interpreting “projected disposable 
income” in § 1325(b)(1), while the 9th Circuit adopted a “mechanical 
interpretation.”  Id. at 263–65.  The 5th Circuit agreed with the 8th and 
10th Circuits in finding that a flexible interpretation “accounts for the 
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relevant statutory language, including the phrases ‘to be received in the 
applicable commitment period,’ ‘as of the effective date of the plan,’ and 
‘will be applied to make payments.’”  Id. at 266.  The court disagreed 
with the 9th Circuit, finding that its interpretation of § 1325(b)(1) “fails 
to address this language, and overly emphasizes the modified definition 
of ‘disposable income’ without recognizing the independent significance 
of the word ‘projected.’”  Id.  The court further stated that “[t]his word 
allows for calculation of future income and expenses based on present 
data, including evidence extrinsic to that used in the calculation of 
‘disposable income’ under § 1325(b)(2).”  Id.  Thus, the 5th Circuit 
concluded that “a debtor’s ‘disposable income’ calculated under § 
1325(b)(2) and multiplied by the applicable commitment period is 
presumptively the debtor’s ‘projected disposable income’ under § 
1325(b)(1)(B), but that any party may rebut this presumption by 
presenting evidence of present or reasonably certain future events that 
substantially change the debtor’s financial situation.”  Id. 
Chapter Thirteen Bankruptcy – Taxes Payable During Pending 
Case: Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd., 578 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) 
The 9th Circuit addressed when taxes become payable to a 
governmental unit while the case is pending, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 
1305(a)(1).  Id. at 1074.  The 5th Circuit determined that taxes payable 
are taxes that must be paid immediately, while the Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel (BAP) for the 10th Circuit found that the term payable is best 
construed as some time before the last permissible day to pay taxes.  Id. 
at 1075.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 10th Circuit BAP in finding that 
Congress intended to cover a debtor’s tax liability at a time prior to the 
point when that liability becomes legally actionable.  Id.  The 9th Circuit 
disagreed with the 5th Circuit that the word payable in customary usage 
means more than just capable of being paid, but also justly due and 
legally enforceable.  Id. at 1075.  Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded “only 
taxes incurred post-petition may be treated as post-petition claims under 
section 1305(a).”  Id. at 1076. 
Chapter Thirteen Bankruptcy – Monthly Expense Accounts: In 
re Washburn, 579 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2009) 
The 8th Circuit addressed “whether ‘applicable monthly expense 
amounts’ [under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)] means an expense that 
the debtor in fact incurs or whether this term means merely the IRS-
designated expense amounts listed as Local Standards applicable in a 
given geographic region for a debtor’s number of vehicles.”  Id. at 936.  
The 5th and 7th Circuits held “that a debtor need not have a vehicle loan 
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or lease payment to claim a vehicle ownership expense amount . . . .”  Id.  
The 9th Circuit held that “a debtor [is not allowed] to deduct an 
‘ownership cost’ (as opposed to an ‘operating cost’) that the debtor does 
not have.”  Id. at 942.  The court agreed with the 5th and 7th Circuits in 
holding that the statutory text, legislative intent and history, and policy 
considerations weighed in favor of the “statutory language” 
interpretation of the statute.  Id. at 937–40.  The court disagreed with the 
9th Circuit in holding that “it is [not] appropriate to give § 
707(B)(2)(A)(ii)(I) one meaning when applied in a Chapter Seven 
proceeding and another when applied in a Chapter Thirteen proceeding 
without a legislative basis for doing so.”  Id. at 940.  Therefore, the 8th 
Circuit held that “a debtor need not in fact owe a vehicle loan or lease 
payment to claim a vehicle-ownership expense in accordance with § 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).”  Id. at 940. 
Undue Hardship Determinations – Ripeness: Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. v. Coleman, 560 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether ‘undue hardship’ 
determinations—whereby bankruptcy courts decide whether student 
loans qualify for discharge—are ripe in a Chapter 13 case substantially in 
advance of plan completion.”  Id. at 1002–03.  The 9th Circuit noted that 
the 4th Circuit determined that the issue of student loan dischargeability 
is ripe before the completion of plan payments, while the 8th and 5th 
Circuits found loan dischargeability is not ripe until completion.  Id. at 
1008.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 4th Circuit’s approach that 
permits a debtor to choose the “snapshot date” for determining undue 
hardship, on the grounds that the text of the pertinent statute does not 
prohibit such an advance determination.”  Id. at 1010 (internal quotations 
omitted).  The court disagreed with the 8th and 5th Circuits because “the 
factual question is whether there is undue hardship at the time of 
discharge, not whether there is undue hardship at the time that a § 
523(a)(8) proceeding is commenced.”  Id.  Thus the 9th Circuit 
concluded that “an undue hardship determination can be ripe 
substantially in advance of plan completion.”  Id. at 1008–09. 
BUSINESS LAW 
Fiduciary Duty – Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA): 
Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009) 
The 8th Circuit addressed “the scope of the fiduciary duty imposed 
on advisers of mutual funds by § 36(b) of the [ICA]” which states that 
investment advisers have a fiduciary duty when receiving compensation 
2009] Current Circuit Splits 143 
for services.  Id. at 818, 821.  The court noted that the 2nd Circuit 
developed a standard that could be used to determine whether a fee 
charged by an investor “represents a charge within the range of what 
would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances.”  Id. at 821.  In considering this standard, the 
2nd Circuit listed factors which take into account, among other things, 
the quality of the services, profitability of the fund, fees of comparable 
funds and independence of the board of directors.  Id.  The 3rd and 4th 
Circuits approved this framework to determine if an adviser has breached 
his or her fiduciary duty.  Id. at 822.  However, the 7th Circuit rejected 
this approach and instead placed the duty on the fiduciary, not the court, 
when determining the reasonableness of the fee, noting that “a fiduciary 
must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on 
compensation.”  Id.  The 8th Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit’s 
approach for determining if fees are excessive.  Id. at 823.  However, the 
court found the 2nd Circuit’s standard flawed in its application, since the 
framework contemplates only one way in which the adviser’s fiduciary 
duty can be breached.  Id.  Furthermore, the 8th Circuit noted that the 
size of an adviser’s fee is a major factor for courts to consider and the 
court agreed with the 7th Circuit that “advisers [have] a duty to be honest 
and transparent throughout the negotiation process.”  Id.  Thus, the 8th 
Circuit concluded that the scope of an adviser’s fiduciary duty under § 
36(b) depends on “both the adviser’s conduct during negotiation[s] and 
the end result” and “[u]nscrupulous behavior with respect to either can 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.”  Id. at 823. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Appellate Review – Waiver of Argument: Ford-Evans v. United 
Space Alliance LLC, 329 F. App’x 519 (5th Cir. 2009) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether an appellee’s failure to raise an 
issue before the district court estops him from presenting that argument 
on appeal.  Id. at 523.  The court noted that both the Supreme Court and 
the 5th Circuit have permitted appellees to raise arguments on appeal not 
considered by the district court.  Id.  The court also noted, however, that 
the 3rd Circuit has precluded appellees from raising arguments on appeal 
not previously raised.  The 6th and 7th Circuits have declined to rule on 
the issue in the specific context of appellee proffers.  Id. at 525 n.2.  
Following Supreme Court precedent, the 5th Circuit found that an 
appellate court may consider appellee arguments not previously raised 
before the district court.  Id. 
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Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA) – Wilton/Brillhart Abstention 
Doctrine: R.R. St. & Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 711 
(7th Cir. 2009) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the Wilton/Brillhart abstention 
doctrine, which grants “district courts . . . considerable leeway in 
deciding whether to entertain declaratory judgment actions even though 
subject matter jurisdiction is established,” was an appropriate basis for 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims seeking “both declaratory and non-
declaratory relief.”  Id. at 714–15.  The court noted that the 5th Circuit 
holds the Wilton/Brillhart abstention completely inapplicable to all 
claims if “an action includes a claim for declaratory relief along with any 
non-frivolous claim for coercive relief.”  Id. at 715.  In contrast, the court 
further noted that the 9th Circuit first inquires as to the independent 
nature of the non-declaratory claims, allowing independent claims to 
continue after abstaining from the declaratory claims, but “[w]here the 
non-declaratory claims are not independent, the district court has 
discretion under Wilton/Brillhart to abstain from hearing the entire 
action.”  Id. at 716.  The court disagreed with the 5th Circuit as “the mere 
fact that a litigant seeks some non-frivolous, non-declaratory relief” 
defeating a district court’s Wilton/Brillhart discretion would be an undue 
curtailment of the unique discretion granted to a district court.  Id.  Thus, 
the 7th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit in first inquiring into the 
independent nature of the non-declaratory claims, allowing the 
continuation of independent non-declaratory claims after exercising 
Wilton/Brilhart discretion over the declaratory claims, and further 
allowing “the court [to] exercise its discretion under Wilton/Brillhart and 
abstain from hearing the entire action” when the non-declaratory claims 
are not independent claims.  Id. at 717. 
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) – Attorney’s Fees: Stephens 
v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2009) 
The 4th Circuit addressed whether attorney’s fees under the EAJ 
“are payable directly to the claimants and not their attorneys.”  Id. at 137.  
The court noted that the 10th, 11th and Federal Circuits determined that 
fees are payable to the claimant, while the 5th, 6th and 8th Circuits found 
the fee award was payable to the attorney.  Id.  The 4th Circuit agreed 
with the 10th and 11th Circuits in finding the “statutory language clearly 
provides that the prevailing party, who incurred the attorney’s fees, and 
not that party’s attorney, is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees.”  Id. 
at 138 (internal citations omitted).  The court further stated “settled law 
that the attorney does not have standing to apply for the EAJA fees; that 
right belongs to the prevailing party.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
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Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded “attorney’s fees under the EAJA are 
payable to the claimant, not the attorney, and thus are subject to 
administrative offset.”  Id. 
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) – Attorney’s Fees: Bryant v. 
Commissioner of Social Security, 578 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2009) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “attorney fees under the EAJA 
are the property of and are payable directly to [a client’s] attorney.”  Id. 
at 446.  The court noted that the 4th, 10th, and 11th Circuits found that 
the statutory language of the EAJA provides fees to the prevailing party 
who incurred the fees, and not that party’s attorney.  Id. at 447.  The 8th 
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, however only because “it was 
constrained by prior precedent.”  Id.  The court disagreed with the 8th 
Circuit’s interpretation as inconsistent with the language in two Supreme 
Court opinions, the EAJA’s plain language, and the holdings of most 
other circuit courts.  Id. at 448.  Thus the 6th Circuit agreed with the 4th, 
10th, and 11th Circuits in finding that under “the plain language of the 
EAJA . . . the prevailing party, and not her attorney, is the proper 
recipient of attorney fees under the EAJA.”  Id. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) – Statute of Limitations: 
Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 578 F.3d 279 (9th Cir. 2009) 
The 9th Circuit held that a plaintiff may amend a complaint to name 
a defendant in his individual capacity, rather than in his official capacity, 
after the statute of limitations has run.  Id. at 284.  The court rejected the 
restrictive approaches of the 6th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits, and instead 
adopted the flexible approach of the 7th Circuit, stating that “Rule 15(c) 
serves as a useful guide to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal 
right to bring their problems before the court.”  Id. at 286.  The 9th 
Circuit noted that the defendant-appellee “received sufficient notice of 
the lawsuit, was not prejudiced in preparing a defense, and knew or 
should have known that but for the mistake of identity he would have 
been named in the original pleading . . . .”  Id. at 290.  The court sought 
to adhere to a “sensible approach to reading a complaint so that suits may 
be maintained regardless of technical pleading errors as is required by 
Rule 15(c).”  Id. at 289-90. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) – Legal Error Review: 
Benson v. St. Joseph Reg’l Health Ctr., 575 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 
2009) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a legal error can be raised in a 
Rule 60(b) motion.”  Id. at 547.  Noting a preexisting circuit split, the 
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court cited its rule “that a Rule 60(b) motion may be used to rectify an 
obvious error of law, apparent on the record.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  The 5th Circuit described its rationale in that by “focus[ing] on 
obvious legal error, which this court as a matter of course would correct 
anyway, . . . prevent[s] a Rule 60(b) motion from being used as a 
substitute for a timely appeal on disputed issues.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  The court concluded that the “alleged legal error is not one 
appropriately characterized as an obvious error of law,” and in order for 
the court to “reach the merits of [the claim], [they] would be required to 
determine how the Texas Supreme Court would interpret state law. . . 
[which] is not the sort of legal error previously entertained pursuant to a 
Rule 60(b) motion.”   Id. at 548–49. 
Jury Instructions – Pretext: Browning v. U.S., 567 F.3d 1038 
(2009) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether a district court’s refusal to give 
a permissive jury instruction regarding pretext in an employment 
discrimination case is reversible error.”  Id. at 1039.   The court noted 
that the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 10th and 11th Circuits determined that a 
permissive pretext jury instruction is not required, while the 1st, 7th and 
8th Circuits held the contrary.  Id. at 1041.  The 9th Circuit reasoned that 
“the court told [the plaintiff] that, although it would not give her 
requested pretext instruction, she was free to explain to the jurors that 
they could find the [defendant’s] reasons for firing her to be pretextual 
and infer an unlawful motive.”  Id. at 1042.  The 9th Circuit further noted 
that the district court’s jury instructions “set forth the essential elements 
that [the Plaintiff] had to prove in order to prevail.”  Id.  Thus, the 9th 
Circuit concluded that so long as the instructions as a “whole set forth 
the essential elements that [one had to] prove, the court did not err in 
refusing to give [the] proposed pretext instructions.”  Id. at 1040. 
Personal Jurisdiction – Minimum Contacts: Touchcom, Inc. v. 
Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
The Federal Circuit addressed whether “the act of filing an 
application for a U.S. patent at the [United States Patent and Trademark 
Office] is sufficient to subject the filing attorney to personal jurisdiction 
in a malpractice claim that is based upon that filing and is brought in 
federal court.”  Id. at 1409.  The court noted that, as to the second 
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), “the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, 
Eleventh, and DC Circuits have adopted an approach that places the 
burden on the defendant.”  Id. at 1414.  “Under that approach, a court is 
entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2) to determine whether it possesses personal 
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jurisdiction over the defendant unless the defendant names a state in 
which the suit can proceed.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  The court 
acknowledged that the approach of the 1st and 4th Circuits requires that 
“a plaintiff must certify that defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any 
state, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to refute the 
plaintiffs certification.”  Id.  The Federal Circuit agreed with the 5th, 7th, 
9th, 11th, and DC Circuits, finding that “in federal cases, the purposes of 
Rule 4(k)(2) are best achieved when the defendant is afforded the 
opportunity to avoid the application of the rule only when it designates a 
suitable forum . . . .”  Id. at 1415.  The court disagreed with the 1st and 
4th Circuits because that approach allows “some defendants to escape 
jurisdiction due to the excessive burden involved in making such a 
showing.”  Id.  The could also felt that the “approach would not allow 
plaintiffs to plead jurisdiction in the alternative under Rule 4(k)(1)(A) 
and Rule 4(k)(2).”  Id.  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that “if the 
defendant contends that he cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses 
to identify any other where suit is possible, then the federal court is 
entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2).”  Id. 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Comity: Coors Brewing Co. v. 
Mendez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2009) 
The 1st Circuit addressed “whether the principles of comity 
described in U.S. Brewers are intact after Hibbs . . . .”  Id. at 16.  The 
court noted that the 6th and 7th Circuits “have adopted a narrowed view 
of comity principles in light of Hibbs.”  Id.  The court further noted the 
9th Circuit “has also suggested that Hibbs limited the reach of comity . . . 
.”  Id.  However, the 4th Circuit “has relied on U.S. Brewers, even after 
Hibbs, to refuse jurisdiction.”  Id.  The 1st Circuit did not find the 
position of the 4th Circuit convincing and agreed with the 6th Circuit in 
finding that “to permit the broad use of comity in a situation like this 
one, runs squarely against Hibbs’s instruction that comity guts federal 
jurisdiction only when plaintiffs try to thwart tax collection.”  Id. at 18 
(internal quotations omitted).  Moreover, “an unduly broad view of 
comity would render an Act of Congress—the Tax Injunction Act—
effectively superfluous, as its contours would never be dispositive so 
long as extant ‘comity principles’ uniformly barred challenges to state 
taxation.”  Id.  Thus, the 1st Circuit concluded “that comity does not bar 
federal courts from hearing suits seeking to invalidate state tax laws that 
afford preferential tax treatment to third parties where such challenge 
would not arrest state revenue generation.”  Id. 
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Waiver of Counsel – Required Disclosure: Lamay v. Astrue, 562 
F.3d 503 (2d Cir. 2009) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed the issue of how much information must 
be disclosed to a plaintiff in order for a waiver of court-appointed 
counsel to be valid.  Id. at 507.  Rather than order that a court must issue 
more disclosure than required by 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(c) and 1383(d)(2) 
regarding the statutory right to counsel, the 2nd Circuit broke with the 
5th, 7th, and 11th Circuits and determined that what is required under the 
statutes is sufficient.  Id. at 507–09.  These circuits utilize a three-part 
test that requires the pro se claimant be informed of “(1) the manner in 
which an attorney can aid in the proceedings, (2) the possibility of free 
counsel or a contingency arrangement, and (3) the limitation on attorney 
fees to twenty-five percent of past due benefits and required court 
approval of the fees.”  Id. at 507.  The court disagreed with the other 
circuits because those circuits decided similar cases prior to the addition 
of greater notice requirements to 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(c) and 1383(d)(2) by 
Pub. L. No. 101–239.  Id. at 508.  These additional notice requirements 
included that the claimant be advised in writing of “(1) her ‘options for 
obtaining [an] attorney[] to represent [her]’ at her hearing, and (2) ‘the 
availability . . . of . . . organizations which provide legal services free of 
charge’ to ‘qualifying claimants.’”  Id. at 507.  The 2nd Circuit noted that 
the 5th, 7th, and 11th Circuits created their three-part test for mandatory 
disclosures as a means of ensuring an informed waiver of counsel.  Id.  
The 2nd Circuit held that the revised statute provided an adequate basis 
for a valid, informed waiver of court-appointed counsel.  Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
First Amendment – Child Pornography: United States v. Wilson, 
565 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2009) 
The 8th Circuit addressed “whether the First Amendment requires 
reading a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense” into 18 U.S.C. § 2251 
(sexual exploitation of children).  Id. at 1068.  The court noted that the 
9th Circuit held that “imposition of major criminal sanctions on these 
defendants without allowing them to interpose a reasonable-mistake-of-
age-defense would choke off protected speech.”  Id.  The court also 
noted, however, that the 5th and 11th Circuits found that the Constitution 
does not mandate a mistake-of-age-defense under the statute.  Id.  The 
court agreed with the latter circuits, and found that the statute neither 
contains a mens rea requirement nor permits an affirmative mistake-of-
age-defense.  Id. at 1069.  Accordingly, the 8th Circuit, under the 
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circumstances of this case, did not contemplate the defendant’s appeal on 
these grounds.  Id. at 1071. 
First Amendment – Freedom of Speech: Roach v. Stouffer, 560 
F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009) 
The 8th Circuit addressed “whether the messages contained on 
specialty [license] plates communicate government or private speech.”  
Id. at 864.  The court noted that the 4th, 7th, and 9th Circuits determined 
that the message on the specialty plate did not communicate government 
speech and, therefore, implicated private-speech rights while the 6th 
Circuit found that it was government speech.  Id. at 867.  The 8th Circuit 
agreed with the 4th, 7th, and 9th Circuits in finding that “a reasonable 
and fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the 
organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays the 
specialty license plate” and not the state government.  Id.  The court 
disagreed with the 6th Circuit’s “proposition that when the government 
determines an overarching message and retains power to approve every 
word disseminated at its behest, the message must be attributed to the 
government for First Amendment purposes.”  Id. at 865.  Thus, the 8th 
Circuit concluded that “messages communicated on specialty plates are 
private speech, not government speech.”  Id. at 868. 
Substantive Due Process – Qualified Immunity: Green v. Post, 
574 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2009) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the protections of qualified 
immunity afforded to officers in high-speed chases attach only when “the 
law was not clearly established at the time of the incident.”  Id. at 1304.  
The court declined to adopt the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits’ approach 
applying an “intent-to-harm standard . . . to all § 1983 substantive due 
process claims . . . regardless of whether the . . . pursing officers [had] 
time to deliberate.”  Id. at 1308.  The court found that “[w]hile it may 
have been clearly established that an officer can be liable if the plaintiffs 
show that he intended to harm the plaintiffs in the context of a high-
speed pursuit, it was not clearly established what specific standard 
applied.”  Id. at 1304.  The 10th Circuit concluded that the officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly 
established at the time of the incident “such that a reasonable officer in 
[appellant’s] situation would have known that his conduct was a 
violation of [appellee’s] constitutional rights.”  Id. at 1310. 
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Tenth Amendment – Standing: United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 
522 (8th Cir. 2009) 
The 8th Circuit addressed “whether a private individual has 
standing to bring a Tenth Amendment claim.”  Id. at 526.  The court 
noted that the 1st, 2nd, 9th and 10th Circuits have concluded that private 
parties lack standing to raise a Tenth Amendment claim, while the 7th 
and 11th Circuits have permitted private parties to bring such claims.  Id.  
The 8th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 9th and 10th Circuits that their 
“conclusion finds support in the Court’s more general standing 
jurisprudence.”  Id. at 527.  Thus, the 8th Circuit joined “the majority of 
circuits and [held] that a private party does not have standing to assert 
that the federal government is encroaching on state sovereignty in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment absent the involvement of a state or 
its instrumentalities.”  Id. at 526. 
CONTRACTS 
Choice-of-Law Provision – Effect on Third Parties in Maritime 
In Rem Actions: Triton Marine Fuels Ltd. v. M/V Pacific 
Chukotka, 575 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2009) 
The 4th Circuit addressed whether a choice-of-law provision is 
enforceable against a third party if such enforcement would adversely 
affect the rights of an entity that is not a party to the agreement.  Id. at 
414.  The court noted that the 2nd Circuit will not enforce such 
provisions, while the 5th and 9th Circuits found no fundamental 
unfairness in enforcement because such provisions are “a consequence 
obviously contemplated by the contracting parties,” and those parties 
agreed to have their transaction governed by the laws of the jurisdiction 
of which the vessel sailed into.  Id. at 415–16.  The court also reasoned 
that where the third party affected is the ship owner itself, it is a party 
that has a direct contractual relationship with the sub-charterer, the 
contracting party.  Id. at 415 n.3.  The 4th Circuit agreed with the 5th and 
9th Circuits, finding that approach “not only well-reasoned, but . . . 
consistent with the holdings of the Supreme Court.”  Id. at 415.  The 
court disagreed with the 2nd Circuit based on that court’s “refus[al] to 
apply the law as chosen by the contracting parties after engaging in only 
a cursory analysis” and failure to apply Supreme Court precedent.  Id.  
Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded “that absent compelling reasons of 
public policy, a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract should be 
enforced.”  Id. at 415. 
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IMMIGRATION 
Deportation – Retroactive Impermissibility: Ferguson v. United 
States AG, 563 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the repeal of Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) “§ 
212(c) relief [has] an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens [] who 
were convicted of deportable criminal offenses by a jury prior to 
IIRIRA’s effective date.”  Id. at 1258.  The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, 
4th, 5th, 7th, 9th and 10th Circuits “held that IIRIRA does not have an 
impermissible retroactive effect on aliens who relied on § 212(c) relief in 
deciding to go to trial” while the 3rd Circuit “does not require aliens to 
show reliance or a reliance interest—either objective or subjective—on § 
212(c) relief and has concluded that IIRIRA’s repeal of § 212(c) is 
impermissibly retroactive in that it attaches new legal consequences to an 
alien’s criminal conviction.”  Id. at 1266.  The court agreed with the 
majority of circuits in finding that §212(c) relief is not available to aliens 
who go to trial because they do not satisfy the reliance requirement. Id. at 
1271. The court disagreed with the 3rd Circuit’s “new legal consequence 
approach.”  Id. at 1270.  Thus the 11th Circuit concluded “reliance is a 
component of the retroactivity analysis as it applies to aliens, deportable 
for criminal offenses, who wish to show that the repeal of § 212(c) of the 
IIRIRA has an impermissible retroactive effect.”  Id. at 1271. 
Deportation and Removal – Recession of Adjustment of Status: 
Stolaj v. Holder, 577 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2009) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “the five-year statute of 
limitations on rescission proceedings in [8 U.S.C.] § 1256(a) applies to 
removal proceedings.”  Id. at 656.  The court noted that the 4th, 8th, and 
9th Circuits “have rejected the argument that the five-year statute of 
limitations on rescission proceedings in § 1256(a) applies to removal 
proceedings,” while the 3rd Circuit “hold that § 1256(a)’s statute of 
limitation applies to removal proceedings.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit agreed 
with the former circuits, noting that § 1256(a)’s statute of limitations is 
not ambiguous in application to rescission proceedings only, and “[e]ven 
if the provision is ambiguous when charges supporting removal would 
also support rescission of status, the Attorney General’s opinion that § 
1256(a) does not apply to removal is reasonable and is entitled to 
deference.”  Id. at 657.  Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that § 1256(a)’s 
five-year statute of limitations “does not time-bar the Government from 
bringing removal proceedings against the defendant.”  Id. 
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Deportation and Removal – Motion to Reconsider: Rosillo-Puga 
v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009) 
The 10th Circuit addressed the issue of whether, pursuant to the 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), aliens who have been removed from the United 
States may file a motion to reopen or reconsider their removal 
proceeding that impose a post-departure bar.  Id. at 1153.  The 10th 
Circuit declined to join the 4th Circuit’s majority opinion that declared 
post-departure regulations invalid, and instead adopted the rationale of 
the 4th Circuit’s dissenting opinion, holding that the regulations are valid 
and further found it to be implausible that “Congress would repeal the 
post-departure bar, without doing or even saying anything about the 
forty-year history of the Attorney General incorporating such a bar in his 
regulations.”  Id. at 1157.  The 10th Circuit noted that “8 C.F.R. § 
1003.23(b)(1) . . . is a valid exercise of the Attorney General’s 
Congressionally-delegated rulemaking authority, and does not 
contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) or (7)(A).”  Id. at 1156.  Finally, 
the court concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.23(b)(1) provide that “any departure from the United States . . . 
occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, 
shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.”  Id. at 1159. 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) – Treatment as Spouse: 
Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2009) 
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether an alien-spouse whose citizen-
spouse filed the necessary ‘immediate relative’ form under 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1154, 1255(c)(4), [a Form I-130 petition] but died within two years of 
the qualifying marriage, nonetheless remains a ‘spouse’ under 8 U.S.C. § 
1151(b)(2)(A)(i) and is entitled to treatment as a ‘spouse’ when the 
[Department of Homeland Security] adjudicates that alien’s petition to 
adjust his/her status to that of a lawful permanent resident.”  Id. at 255.  
The court noted that the 9th Circuit determined “Congress intended a 
surviving alien-spouse to remain a ‘spouse’ under the ‘immediate 
relative’ provision despite the death of the citizen-spouse,” while the 3rd 
Circuit found that “a surviving alien-spouse is not an immediate relative 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).”  Id.  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 
9th Circuit in its reading of the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 
1151(b)(2)(A)(i), where it noted the first and second sentences of the 
statute should be read independently, so as not to impose any 
“limitation[s] on the [term ‘spouse’] beyond the requirement that both 
parties are present for the marriage ceremony.”  Id. at 256.  Thus, the 6th 
Circuit concluded that “a surviving alien-spouse, whose citizen spouse 
filed a Form I-130 petition prior to his or her death, is a ‘spouse’ under 
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the ‘immediate relative’ provision of the [Immigration and Nationality 
Act].”  Id. at 263. 
Waiver of Deportation – Statutory Counterpart Test: De la 
Rosa v. United States, 579 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether certain deportees who have not 
temporarily left the country are eligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(c).  Id. at 1329.  The court notes a three-way split, which partly 
turns on the extension of § 212(c) relief to deportable aliens regardless of 
whether the alien had left the United States after committing a deportable 
act (the Francis rule).  Id. at 1330.  The Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) and the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Circuits have adopted “the 
Francis rule and have applied the categorical approach when dealing 
with the resulting statutory counterpart test.”  Id. at 1335.  The 2nd 
Circuit has also “adopted the Francis rule but employs an offense-based 
approach when considering the resultant statutory counterpart test.” Id. 
Finally, the 9th Circuit “has abandoned the Francis rule and its 
accompanying statutory counterpart test altogether.”  Id.  The court 
agreed with the BIA and the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Circuits that 
the categorical approach better focuses on the similarity of the 
corresponding grounds of deportation and exclusion and avoids any 
examination of a petitioner’s underlying offense and whether it could 
render him excludable under § 1182(a).  Id.  The court disagreed with the 
2nd Circuit finding that an offense-based approach “rests on a more 
expansive view of equal protection than [the court found] palatable.”  Id. 
at 1337.  Therefore, the 11th Circuit joined the majority of its sister 
circuits, holding that it will apply the Francis rule and adopt the 
categorical approach to the statutory counterpart test.  Id. 
REMEDIES 
Damage Calculation – Lost Medical Benefits: Hance v. Norfolk 
South Railway Co., 571 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2009) 
The 6th Circuit addressed the proper method of calculating lost 
medical benefits by a successful Title VII plaintiff.  Id. at 522.  The court 
noted that the 4th Circuit has determined damages based on the policy’s 
value, while the 7th and 9th Circuits have relied on the cost of substitute 
insurance coverage or actual costs of securing medical care.  Id.  The 6th 
Circuit agreed with 7th and 9th Circuits reasoning that more recent cases 
have followed that approach.  Id.  Thus, the court concluded that 
damages should be awarded “based on actual expenses incurred by a 
plaintiff in securing insurance or medical care.”  Id. 
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
American with Disabilities Act (ADA) – Private Right of 
Action: Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 571 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2009) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d), an 
accompanying regulation of the ADA which “requires public entities to 
develop a ‘transition plan’ for achieving the ADA’s accessibility 
requirements,” creates a private cause of action.  Id. at 848.  The court 
noted that while the 10th Circuit found the regulation creates a private 
right of action, the 1st and 6th Circuits disagree.  Id. at 849.  Agreeing 
with the 1st and 6th Circuits, the 9th Circuit found that § 202 of the ADA 
“says nothing about a public entity’s obligation to draft a detailed plan 
and schedule for achieving . . . meaningful access,” and does not “create 
a private right to such a plan.”  Id. at 851.  The 9th Circuit noted that 
“nothing in the language of § 202 indicates that a disabled person’s 
remedy for the denial of meaningful access lies in . . . private 
enforcement.”  Id.  The court reasoned that “a public entity may be fully 
compliant with § 202 without ever having drafted a transition plan, in 
which case, a lawsuit forcing the public entity to draft such a plan would 
afford the plaintiff no meaningful remedy,” and that “[c]onversely, a 
public entity may have a transition plan that complies, . . . but may still 
be in violation of § 202 by, for example, failing to alter its sidewalks in a 
way that provides meaningful access.”  Id. at 851–52.  The 9th Circuit 
disagreed with the 10th Circuit’s application of prior Supreme Court 
precedent to the analysis of ADA regulations, stating that it requires a 
“more particularized review of the challenged regulation . . . in addition 
to a determination of whether the regulation effectuates the statutory 
right and corresponding remedy.”  Id. at 852.  Thus, the 9th Circuit 
concluded that 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d) is not enforceable through a private 
right of action.  Id. 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA) – Tolling: Kholi v. Wall, 582 F.3d 147 (1st Cir. 2009) 
The 1st Circuit addressed whether “a state-court post-conviction 
motion to reduce an imposed sentence” falls within the scope of the 
limitations tolling provision of the AEDPA.  Id. at 149.  The court noted 
that the 3rd, 4th, and 11th Circuits determined that such a motion, like a 
plea for discretionary leniency, does not give rise to tolling, while the 
10th Circuit found that it did.  Id.  The 1st Circuit agreed with the 10th 
Circuit in finding a state-court post-conviction motion, even one akin to a 
plea for discretionary leniency, is obviously a motion that seeks review 
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of the convict’s sentence, which is exactly what the plain language of the 
AEDPA contemplates as a tolling mechanism.  Id. at 152.  The court 
disagreed with the 4th Circuit’s textual analysis because the 4th Circuit’s 
reading of the statute would read words out of the statute, allowing it to 
incorrectly conclude that state post-conviction motions did not implicate 
tolling.  Id. at 153.  The court also disagreed with the 3rd and 11th 
Circuits as to whether Congress intended such motions to toll limitations. 
Both circuits noted that Congress intended to encourage the exhaustion 
of state remedies and safeguarding the finality of state-court judgments, 
holding that post-conviction motions did not induce tolling controverts 
those intentions.  Id. at 154.  Thus the 1st Circuit concluded that “a state 
post-conviction motion to reduce an imposed sentence that seeks purely 
discretionary leniency and does not challenge the validity of the 
conviction or sentence acts as a tolling mechanism within the purview 
of” the AEDPA.  Id. at 156. 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) – Retaliation Provision: 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834 
(7th Cir. 2009) 
The 7th Circuit addressed “whether unwritten, purely verbal 
complaints are protected activity” under the retaliation provision of the 
FLSA.  Id. at 838.  The court first noted that the FLSA’s retaliation 
provision prohibits discharging an employee because “such employee 
has filed any complaint.”  Id.  The court noted that the 4th and 2nd 
Circuits have found that verbal complaints were not protected activity, 
while the 6th, 8th and 11th Circuits have found that they are.  Id. at 839.  
The court agreed with the 4th Circuit in finding that unwritten, purely 
verbal complaints are not protected activity, because “[t]he use of the 
verb ‘to file’ connotes the use of a writing.”  Id.  The court also agreed 
with the 4th Circuit’s interpretation of the testimony clause of the 
FLSA’s retaliation provision, prohibiting retaliation for testimony “given 
or about to be given but not for an employee’s voicing of a position on 
working conditions in opposition to an employer.”  Id. (emphasis in 
original).  The court disagreed with the 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits, 
[finding that they interpreted] the FLSA’s retaliation provision too 
broadly, contrary to congressional intent.  Id. at 840.  Thus, the 7th 
Circuit concluded that the FLSA’s use of the phrase “file any complaint” 
requires an employee to submit a written complaint, and therefore 
unwritten verbal complaints are not protected activity.  Id. 
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False Claims Act (FCA) – Materiality: United States ex rel 
Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 575 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2009) 
The 5th Circuit addressed what constitutes “the proper standard for 
assessing the materiality of a false statement under the [False Claims 
Act’s] civil-liability provisions.”  Id. at 468.  The 5th Circuit stated that 
previously, “five judges of this Court suggested that outcome materiality 
is the correct standard, explaining that a statement is material only if it 
actually affects the government’s decision to pay.”  Id. at 469.  However, 
the 5th Circuit agreed with the government that the “outcome and claim 
materiality definitions unnecessarily narrow the ‘natural tendency to 
influence or capable of influencing’ test, which is unambiguous and 
easily applied.”  Id.  The court instead adopted the 4th and 6th Circuits’ 
“‘natural tendency test’ for materiality, which focuses on the potential 
effect of the false statement when it is made rather than on the false 
statement’s actual effect after it is discovered . . . because it is more 
consistent with the plain meaning of the FCA.”  Id. at 470 (internal 
citation omitted).  The 5th Circuit noted that “the [8]th Circuit has 
adopted the more restrictive ‘outcome materiality test,’” but chose to 
adopt the broader view, concluding that “[a]ll that is required under the 
test for materiality, therefore, is that the false or fraudulent statements 
have the potential to influence the government’s decisions.”  Id. (internal 
citation omitted). 
 
False Claims Act (FCA) – Qui Tam Action: Glaser v. Wound 
Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2009) 
The 7th Circuit revisited the proper interpretation of the phrase 
“based upon” under the FCA, which provides a jurisdictional bar to a qui 
tam action when a FCA relator’s allegations are based upon information 
about an alleged fraud that is already publicly disclosed.  Id. at 909.  The 
7th Circuit had previously defined “based upon” to mean allegations 
dependent “essentially upon publicly disclosed information and . . . 
actually derived from such information.”  Id.  The court noted that the 
4th Circuit follows its original approach, but that the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 
8th, 9th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits have adopted the approach that “a 
lawsuit is based upon publicly disclosed allegations when the relator’s 
allegations and the publicly disclosed allegations are substantially 
similar.”  Id. at 915.  In overturning its own precedent, the court reasoned 
that its “interpretation of ‘based upon’ as meaning ‘actually derived 
from’ renders the original-source exception superfluous and ignores the 
exception’s role in balancing the FCA’s competing policy goals.”  Id. at 
920.  The court further reasoned that the majority interpretation “treats 
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the question of whether a lawsuit is ‘based upon’ a public disclosure as a 
‘threshold analysis . . . intended to be a quick trigger for the more 
exacting original source analysis.’”  Id.  Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded 
that under the FCA, a relator’s complaint is “based upon” publicly 
disclosed allegations or transactions “when the allegations in the relator’s 
complaint are substantially similar to publicly disclosed allegations.”  Id.  
 
Permissible Time Period for Competency Evaluations – Speedy 
Trial Act: United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 
2009) 
The 6th Circuit addressed “[w]hether the ten day limit in [18 
U.S.C.] § 3161(h)(1)(F) [the Speedy Trial Act] applies to the time in 
which a defendant is transported to a place of examination pursuant to a 
court’s competency evaluation order.”  Id. at 596.  The court noted that 
the 1st and 5th Circuits have held that “an unreasonable delay in the 
transportation of the defendant for a competency determination is not 
excludable,” while the 2nd Circuit found that “any delay associated with 
a competency determination from the date of the order directing the 
evaluation until the completion of the competency hearing, including 
delay from transporting a defendant for the evaluation, is excludable.”  
Id. (emphasis in original).  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 1st and 5th 
Circuits in finding that “all delays caused by proceedings to determine a 
defendant’s competency are excluded, except for the time during which 
the defendant is supposed to be in transit, which is presumptively 
unreasonable if longer than ten days.”  Id.  The court disagreed with the 
2nd Circuit’s reasoning as it “would create an internal conflict in the 
statute, since § 3161(h)(1)(F) expressly limits the reasonableness of the 
transportation period to ten days.”   Id.  Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded 
that “a delay in transporting a defendant to a mental competency 
examination beyond the ten day limit imposed by § 3161(h)(1)(F) is 
presumptively unreasonable, and in the absence of rebutting evidence to 
explain the additional delay, this extra time is not excludable.”  Id. 
Religious Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(RLUIPA) – Consent to Suit for Appropriate Relief: Van Wyhe 
v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2009) 
The 8th Circuit addressed whether a provision of the RLUIPA, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), stating that “conditions the state’s acceptance of 
federal funds, in part, on its consent to suit for ‘appropriate relief,’” 
unambiguously extends to monetary claims.  Id. at 653.  The court first 
pointed out that the statutory phrase creates a private cause of action, and 
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is broad enough to include both injunctive relief and compensatory 
damages.  Id.  The court noted that the 4th Circuit has held, in the 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity waiver context, that 
“appropriate relief” language falls short of waiving the state’s immunity 
from suits for damages.  Id.  The court added that the 6th Circuit found 
that “RLUIPA does not contain a clear indication that Congress 
unambiguously conditioned receipt of federal . . . funds on a state’s 
consent to suit for money damages,” and that the 5th and 6th Circuits 
have expressed similar opinions on the question. Id. In contrast, the court 
noted that that the 11th Circuit had concluded that “appropriate relief” in 
RLUIPA encompasses monetary as well as injunctive relief.  Id.  
Agreeing with the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Circuits, the 8th Circuit held that 
RLUIPA’s “appropriate relief” phrase “does not unambiguously 
encompass monetary damages so as to effect a waiver of sovereign 
immunity from suit for monetary claims . . . by acceptance of the federal 
money.”  Id. at 654.  Disagreeing with the 11th Circuit’s interpretation of 
the phrase, the court pointed out that the Supreme Court has rejected any 
idea that Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity could be 
waived absent an “unequivocal expression of elimination of sovereign 
immunity . . . in statutory text.”  Id. at 653.  Therefore, the 8th Circuit 
concluded that ‘appropriate relief’ as phrased in RLUIPA does not 
extend to monetary claims.  Id. at 654. 
TAX LAW 
Tax Shelters – Economic Substance Doctrine: Klamath Strategic 
Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009) 
The 5th Circuit addressed which standard should apply in deciding 
whether to disregard a financial or business transaction for tax shelter 
purposes as lacking economic reality.  Id. at 544.  The court noted that 
the 3rd, 10th and 11th Circuits determined that a mere lack of economic 
substance is sufficient to invalidate a transaction as lacking economic 
reality, while the 4th Circuit required both lacking economic substance 
and evidence that the taxpayer’s sole transactional motive was tax 
avoidance.  Id.  The 5th Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 10th and 11th 
Circuits, noting that “if a transaction lacks economic substance 
compelled by business or regulatory realities, the transaction must be 
disregarded even if the taxpayers profess a genuine business purpose 
without tax-avoidance motivations.”  Id.  Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded 
that the loan transactions in this case lacked economic substance and 
therefore disregarded for tax purposes.  Id. 
 




Habeas Jurisdiction – Certificate of Appealability: Willis v. 
Jones, 329 F. App’x 7 (6th Cir. 2009) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether an improperly granted certificate 
of appealability precludes an appellate court from exercising appellate 
jurisdiction over a habeas-based motion.   Id. at 12 n.6.  The court noted 
that the 2nd, 7th, and 10th Circuits found that even an improperly 
granted certificate of appealability vests jurisdiction with an appellate 
court, while the 3rd, 5th, 8th Circuits found that a defective certificate of 
appealability precludes an appellate court from exercising such 
jurisdiction.  Id.  The 6th Circuit agreed with the former circuits and 
concluded that “a certificate of appealability, even if improvidently 
granted, vests jurisdiction in the court of appeals.”  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
Sentencing – Procedure for Undisputed Sentence Adjustment: 
United States v. Jones, 567 F.3d 712 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
The D.C. Circuit remanded to the district court to modify 
defendant’s sentence when neither side disputed that an amendment to 
the Sentencing Guidelines called for a reduced sentence, but the 
government had argued that the proper procedure for the D.C. Circuit 
was to affirm the sentence without prejudice and “leave it to [defendant] 
to file a petition with the district court.”  Id. at 719.  The D.C. Circuit 
chose not to join the 4th Circuit, which had adopted the approach favored 
by the government.  Id.  Instead, the D.C. Circuit joined the 1st, 3rd, 6th, 
8th, 9th, and 11th Circuits in remanding “to save the defendant the 
‘additional step’ of petitioning the district court for a sentencing 
modification.”  Id. 
Sentencing – Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 
(MVRA): United States v. Balentine, 569 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2009) 
The 8th Circuit addressed as a matter of first impression “[t]he 
authority of a district court to order restitution beyond the 90-day limit” 
imposed by the MVRA.  Id. at 803.  The 8th Circuit noted that the 6th, 
7th and 11th Circuits all denied restitution orders after 90 days.  Id.  In 
contrast, “[o]ther circuits have concluded the 90-day limit is subject to 
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equitable tolling if the delay in entering a restitution order is attributable 
to the defendant.”  Id. at 804.  For example, the 10th Circuit held that 
while there was “a 90-day limit on making a determination of the 
victim’s losses . . . [that limit] was subject to equitable tolling “[w]here a 
defendant’s own conduct delayed the timely entry of a restitution order . . 
. .”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  Finally, the 9th and 2nd Circuits 
“applied harmless error review to violations of the 90-day limit, 
concluding the error is harmless unless the delay prejudiced the 
defendant’s rights.”  Id.  From these various holdings, the 8th Circuit 
noted that “these courts have concluded the procedural requirements . . . 
are intended to protect victims, not the victimizers . . . [and] [t]he 
purpose behind the statutory ninety-day limit on the determination of 
victims’ losses is not to protect defendants from drawn-out sentencing 
proceedings or to establish finality; rather, it is to protect crime victims 
from the willful dissipation of defendants’ assets.”  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted).  The 8th Circuit thus concluded that “[a]bsent a 
defendant’s clear showing that his substantial rights have been 
prejudiced by a [MVRA provision] delay, it would in fact, defeat the 
statutory purpose to allow a defendant to invoke this provision in order to 
avoid paying restitution to the victims of his crime.”  Id. (internal citation 
omitted). 
Sentencing Guidelines – Effect of Prefatory Clause: United 
States v. Abbott, 574 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether the penalty prescribed by 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) for felony possession of a firearm permits a concurrent 
term of imprisonment with any other term of imprisonment imposed for 
any other crime.  Id. at 206.  The court noted that the majority of circuits 
determined that “a sentence imposed for a separate offense cannot 
supplant or abrogate a § 924(c) sentence under the statute’s prefatory 
clause.”  Id.  The 2nd Circuit takes a minority approach holding that 
“where a defendant is exposed to two minimum sentences . . . only the 
higher minimum should apply.”  Id. at 210. (internal quotations omitted).  
The 3rd Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits in finding that the 
plain language of the statute and congressional intent “connotes a 
comparison between alternative minimum sentences for a violation of § 
924(c), not between sentences for separate violations of § 924(c) and 
another statute.”  Id. at 211.  This court found the 2nd Circuit’s reasoning 
flawed as “the language of the statute . . . does not plainly suggest that a 
sentence under § 924(c) may be abrogated or supplanted by a greater 
minimum sentence that happens to be imposed for an entirely separate 
offense.”  Id.  Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that the statute’s prefatory 
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clause refers to alternative minimum sentences for violations of § 924(c) 
and a sentence imposed for a separate offense cannot supplant or 
abrogate a sentence for felony possession of a firearm under § 924 (c).  
Id. 
Sentencing Guidelines – Effect of Prefatory Clause: United 
States v. Segarra, 528 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2009) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the plain language of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c) for felony possession of a firearm either prohibits or requires 
consecutive sentences where the defendant is convicted of both a firearm 
offense and another crime.  Id. at 1270-71.  The court noted that the 2nd 
Circuit held that it was improper to impose consecutive sentences 
pursuant to § 924(c) where the mandatory minimum for the underlying 
offense exceeds the applicable minimum under the firearm statute 
because the “‘except’ clause should be read literally and the plain 
language of the statute dictate[s] that the mandatory minimum would not 
apply to the firearm offense if any other provision of law required a 
higher mandatory minimum sentence.”  Id. at 1272.  However, every 
other circuit to address the issue allows consecutive sentences for both a 
firearm offense and another crime.  Id.  The 11th Circuit agreed with the 
majority of circuits in finding the “except” clause is merely “intended to 
prevent consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for more than one 
firearm offense.”  Id.  The court disagreed with the 2nd Circuit because 
that approach ignores the plain language of § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which 
provides that “no term of imprisonment . . . under this subsection shall 
run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed.”  Id. at 
1273.  Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded that the plain language of § 924, 
in its entirety, dictates consecutive sentences for a § 924(c) firearm 
offenses and another underlying offense simultaneously because the 
“except” clause is only intended “to prevent consecutive mandatory 
minimum sentences for more than one firearm offense.”  Id. at 1272. 
Sentencing Guidelines – Post-Booker Mandatory Minimum 
Sentence: United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2009) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether Booker alters the mandatory 
character of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.  Id. at 237.  The court noted that the 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 10th and 11th Circuits determined that Booker did 
not affect the guidelines’ mandatory character as Booker only applied to 
full sentencings, while the 9th Circuit found that Booker did apply to § 
1B1.10, thus making the guideline advisory and not mandatory.  Id. at 
237–38.  The 5th Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits in finding 
“there are clear and significant differences between original sentencing 
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proceedings and sentence modification proceedings,” and that “[t]hese 
differences explain why Booker does not affect Guideline § 1B1.10.”  Id. 
at 238.  The court disagreed with the 9th Circuit because the 9th Circuit 
relied on case law that was “prior to the 2008 amendments to Guideline § 
1B1.10.”  Id. Thus the 5th Circuit found that Booker does not alter the 
mandatory character of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.  Id. 
Sentencing Discretion – Mandatory Minimum Sentence: United 
States v. Grant, 567 F.3d 776 (6th Cir. 2009) 
The 6th Circuit departed from the 11th and 9th Circuits when it 
held that a district court judge may consider factors other than the 
defendant’s substantial assistance to the government in reducing the 
sentence of a defendant sentenced to a mandatory minimum when the 
government has made a motion for a reduced sentence under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).  Id. at 783.  The 9th and 11th Circuits 
previously held that district courts could consider factors besides 
substantial governmental assistance when deciding a Rule 35(b) motion 
for the purposes of reducing the extent of the downward departure but 
district courts were prohibited from considering “any factor that may 
militate in favor of the reduction [of defendant’s sentence] other than the 
defendant’s substantial assistance.”  Id. at 781–82.  The 6th Circuit 
disagreed, arguing that the plain language of Rule 35(b) “sets up the 
defendant’s substantial assistance as simply a condition precedent to a 
reduction,” but “does not provide any particular limitations on what 
factors that reduction may or may not reflect.”  Id. at 782.  The court held 
that “[o]nce the grip of the mandatory minimum sentence is broken, the 
sentencing judge may consider § 3553(a), including subsection (2)(D) on 
rehabilitation.”  Id. at 778. 
Supervised Release – Restitution Payments: United States v. 
Baldwin, 563 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether the U.S. Probation Office has 
the authority to modify an inmate’s monthly restitution payments while 
she is on supervised release.  Id. at 491.  The 4th Circuit held “that 
allowing probation officers to modify monthly restitution payments 
conflicts with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664 and Article III of the 
Constitution.”  Id. at 492.  In contrast, the 9th Circuit held “that so long 
as the district court determines the total amount of restitution to be paid, 
it may properly allow the Probation Office to set the schedule of 
payments.”  Id.  The D.C. Circuit noted the 7th Circuit’s reasoning in a 
case dealing with a district court’s discretion to delegate its authority to 
specify restitution payment schedules, in which the 7th Circuit reasoned 
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that since “the Probation Office[‘s] . . . only power derives from the 
court,” such delegation is proper. Id. Thus, the D.C. Circuit aligned itself 
with the 7th and 9th Circuits, and split from the 4th Circuit, in holding 
that a court may delegate an inmate’s monthly restitution payments to the 
U.S. Probation Office.  Id. 
